Abstract:
A programmable integrated circuit, includes an external port, a configuration memory, a hardened write path between the external port and the configuration memory and a soft read path between the configuration memory and the external port, wherein configuration data stored in the configuration memory is only read through the soft read path.
Abstract:
Approaches for configuring a programmable integrated circuit (IC) are disclosed. Encrypted configuration data is input to the programmable IC, and the encrypted configuration data is stored in configuration memory of the programmable IC. As the encrypted configuration data is input, a determination is made as to whether or not the encrypted configuration data is authentic. In response to the encrypted configuration data being authentic, the encrypted configuration data is read from the configuration memory and decrypted, and the decrypted configuration data is stored back in the configuration memory.
Abstract:
A disclosed circuit arrangement includes a bank of efuse cells, first and second sense amplifiers coupled to input signals representing constant logic-1 and logic-0 values, respectively, a storage circuit, an efuse control circuit, and an efuse security circuit. The efuse control circuit inputs signals from the bank of efuse cells and signals that are output from the first and second sense amplifiers, and stores data representative of values of the signals in the storage circuit. The efuse security reads the data from the storage circuit and generates an alert signal having a state that indicates a security violation in response to data representative of the value of the signal from the first sense amplifier indicating a logic-0 value or data representative of the value of the signal from the second sense amplifier indicating a logic-1 value.
Abstract:
A system includes a plurality of watchdog components. Each watchdog component is configured to receive a kick signal from its monitored function to determine whether the monitored function is active. Each watchdog component is further configured to receive a respective token from all watchdog components that the each watchdog component is connected to. The respective token determines whether its respective watchdog component has timed out. Each watchdog component is further configured to generate a token responsive to the kick signal and further responsive to the respective token from all watchdog component that the each watchdog component is connected to. Each watchdog component is further configured to transmit the generated token to the all watchdog components that the each watchdog component is connected to.
Abstract:
An array of non-volatile memory cells includes rows and columns. A volatile storage circuit provides addressable units of storage. A control circuit reads first type data and second type data from one or more of the rows and multiple ones of the columns of the array of non-volatile memory cells. The control circuit stores the first type data and second type data read from each row in one or more addressable units of storage of the volatile storage. A security circuit reads first data from the one or more of the addressable units of the volatile storage and selects from the first data, the second type data that includes one or more bits of each of the one or more of the addressable units. The security circuit performs an integrity check on the selected second type data, and generates an alert signal that indicates a security violation in response to failure of the integrity check.
Abstract:
Disclosed approaches for controlling debug access to an integrated circuit (IC) device include receiving a debug packet by a debug interface circuit of the IC device. The debug interface circuit authenticates the debug packet in response to the debug packet having a command code that specifies enable debug mode or a command code that specifies disable debug mode. In response to the debug packet passing authentication and the command code specifying enable, the debug interface circuit enables debug mode of the IC device. In response to the debug packet passing authentication and the command code specifying disable, the debug interface circuit disables the debug mode of the IC device. In response to the debug packet failing authentication, the debug interface circuit rejects the debug packet.
Abstract:
The disclosure describes approaches for protecting a circuit design for a programmable integrated circuit (IC). A black key is generated from an input red key by a registration circuit implemented on the programmable IC, and the black key is stored in a memory circuit external to the programmable IC. The programmable IC is configured to implement a pre-configuration circuit, which inputs the black key from the memory circuit and generates the red key from the black key. A ciphertext circuit design is decrypted into a plaintext circuit design by the programmable IC using the red key, and the red key is erased from the programmable IC. The programmable IC is reconfigured with the plaintext circuit design.
Abstract:
A system generally relating to an SoC, which may be a field programmable SoC (“FPSoC”), is disclosed. In this SoC, dedicated hardware includes a processing unit, a first internal memory, a second internal memory, an authentication engine, and a decryption engine. A storage device is coupled to the SoC. The storage device has access to a boot image. The first internal memory has boot code stored therein. The boot code is for a secure boot of the SoC. The boot code is configured to cause the processing unit to control the secure boot.