Abstract:
A certificate management processor (CMP) in a public key infrastructure (PKI) receives a request for a certificate management operation. The CMP determines that the request is associated with at least one of an end entity and a service. The CMP identifies a certificate management identifier associated with at least one of the end entity and the service. The CMP retrieves at least one status associated with the certificate management identifier and/or at least one status associated with the certificate management operation. The CMP performs the certificate management operation on a certificate when the retrieved at least one status is determined to not be suspended.
Abstract:
A method and is provided for obtaining a vetted certificate for a microservice in an elastic cloud environment. The microservice receives a one-time authentication credential. The microservice utilizes the one-time authentication credential to obtain a client secret. The microservice obtains an access token and CSR (Certificate Signing Request) attributes using the client secret and constructs a CSR utilizing the CSR attributes. The microservice requests a vetted certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA) and includes the access token and the CSR in the request. If the access token and the CSR pass vetting at the CA, the CA sends a vetted certificate to the microservice.
Abstract:
A single sign-on server associated with a single sign-on client authenticates a user of a device. Subsequent to the authenticating, the single sign-on client receives a request for an authentication token from a single sign-on enabled application operating on the device. The single sign-on client determines whether an application lock flag for the single sign-on enabled application is set. Responsive to the determining, the single sign-on client provides the authentication token to the single sign-on enabled application when the application lock flag is not set and withholds the authentication token from the single sign-on enabled application when the application lock flag is set.
Abstract:
A Public Key Infrastructure (PM) device receives a certificate signing request (CSR) from an end entity. The PKI device obtains at least one of: a controlling attribute of at least one PKI device associated with processing of the certificate signing request and a controlling attribute associated with the CSR. The PKI device obtains an end entity policy object (EEPO) to be associated with the end entity based on at least one obtained controlling attribute. Based on the obtained EEPO, the PKI device determines at least one attribute and at least one value associated with the attribute this is to be included in a certificate and issues, to the end entity, the certificate including the at least one attribute.
Abstract:
In a method a public key infrastructure (PKI) device receives a certificate signing request (CSR) and an identity assertion cryptographically bound to an end entity issuing the CSR. The PKI device validates the authenticity and integrity of the CSR using the identity assertion. In response to validating the authenticity and integrity of the CSR, the PKI device issues a certificate based on at least one of the CSR and fields in the identity assertion.
Abstract:
A certificate issuer (210) can periodically request, receive, and store current server-based certificate validation protocol (SCVP) staples (225) for supported relying parties (205) from at least one server-based certificate validation protocol (SCVP) responder (215). The certificate issuer (210) can receive a contact initiation request (220) from one of the relying parties (205). Responsive to receiving the contact initiation request (220), the certificate issuer (210) can identify a current SCVP staple from the saved staples that is applicable to the relying party (205). The certificate issuer (210) can conveying a response to the contact initiation request (220) to the relying party (205). The response can comprise the identified SCVP staple and a public key infrastructure (PKI) certificate (230) of the certificate issuer. The SCVP staple can validate a certification path between the PKI certificate (230) and a different certificate trusted by the relying party (205).