Abstract:
Aspects of security schemes (e.g., integrity protection, encryption, or both) are described. A measure of access stratum security can be realized without overhead associated with establishing and/or maintaining the per-cellular-device access stratum security context at a Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) base station (C-BS). A gateway (e.g., a CIoT Serving Gateway Node (C-SGN)) may derive a first key. The first key may be only known to the C-SGN. The C-SGN may derive a second key from the first key and a parameter unique to the C-BS. The C-SGN may also derive a third key from the second key and an identity of a cellular device. The C-SGN may send the second and third keys to the C-BS and cellular device, respectively. Small data messages encrypted and/or integrity protected by the cellular device may be decrypted and/or verified by the C-BS.
Abstract:
Protected configuration data may be sent to user equipment subscribed to a first wireless communication network by a second wireless communication network with which the user equipment is registered. The first wireless communication network may protect the configuration data based on at least one first key when sending the data to the second wireless communication network. The second wireless communication network may send the configuration data to user equipment in messages protected by at least one second key. User equipment receives the message from the second wireless communication network, extracts the configuration data using the at least one second key, determines whether the configuration data has been altered at least in part based on the at least one first key, and applies the configuration data if the configuration data has not been altered. The protected configuration data may be sent in an information element of a control plane message.
Abstract:
Techniques for establishing one or more end-to-end secure channels in a data center are provided. A method according to these techniques includes obtaining, at a secure module (SM) associated with a virtual machine (VM) operating on a node of the data center, a VM-specific signature key for the VM from a Hardware Security Module (HSM), and performing a cryptographic signing operation at the SM associated with establishing an end-to-end secure channel between the VM and another networked entity using the VM-specific signature key responsive to a request from the VM.
Abstract:
An electronic device obtains a device password associated with the new enrollee device to be configured for a communication network. The device password is provided to a network registrar to cause the network registrar to configure the new enrollee device for the communication network. The network registrar performs an enrollment process based upon the device password and provides feedback to the electronic device to indicate whether or not the new enrollee device was successfully added to the communication network. Alternatively, when an electronic device detects the presence of a new enrollee device to be configured for the communication network, the electronic device generates a device password for the new enrollee device and provides the device password to the new enrollee device and to the network registrar, thereby causing the network registrar to initiate an enrollment process for the new enrollee device based upon the device password.
Abstract:
The apparatus may be a wireless device configured to receive a set of security parameters associated with one of a layer 1 (L1) link reestablishment procedure or a layer 2 (L2) link reestablishment procedure, detect a failure of a radio link at the wireless device. The apparatus may further be configured to transmit, for a network node, at least one of an L1 link recovery request or an L2 link recovery request, including an authentication value based on the set of security parameters, and receive, based on at least one of the L1 link recovery request or the L2 link recovery request, a link recovery message.
Abstract:
Disclosed are wireless communications systems and techniques. For example, a wireless communication device (e.g., a user equipment (UE)) compares a first key identifier (generated from a key stored in a first storage unit, such as a universal subscriber identity module) to a second key identifier (stored in a second storage unit, such as non-volatile memory) to identify a mismatch between the key identifiers. Based on the mismatch, the device replaces, in the second storage unit, the second key identifier. In some examples, the device verifies integrity of a message using the key, replaces the second key identifier with the first key identifier, and updates a counter based on the message. In a second illustrative example, the device replaces the key with a replacement key, replaces the second key identifier with the third key identifier based on the replacement key, and resets a counter.
Abstract:
Disclosed are systems and techniques for wireless communications. For instance, a process may include transmitting a first radio resource control (RRC) message, the first RRC message including a first establishment cause value indicating that an apparatus does not have priority access. The process may also include determining that priority access may be used by the apparatus, transmitting a second RRC message, the second RRC message including a second establishment cause value indicating that the apparatus has priority access, and accessing a wireless network using the priority access.
Abstract:
A user device having a security context with a first network based on a first key may establish a security context with a second network. In a method, the user device may generate a key identifier based on the first key and a network identifier of the second network. The user device may forward the key identifier to the second network for forwarding to the first network by the second network to enable the first network to identify the first key at the first network. The user device may receive a key count from the second network. The key count may be associated with a second key forwarded to the second network from the first network. The user device may generate the second key based on the first key and the received key count thereby establishing a security context between the second network and the user device.
Abstract:
In embodiments of systems and methods for synchronous content presentation, a user equipment (UE) may generate a freshness parameter, generate a unique session key based on a first session key and the freshness parameter, and send the freshness parameter to a Network Application Function (NAF) of a network device in a configuration that will enable the NAF to generate the unique session key. The network device may receive the freshness parameter, receive from a Key Server Function (KSF) the first session key, and generate based on the freshness parameter and the first session key the unique session key. The UE and the network device may then conduct secure communications using the unique session key without exchanging the unique session key between the two devices.
Abstract:
Aspects directed towards steering of roaming (SoR) are disclosed. In one example, a communication from a public land mobile network (PLMN) is received by a user equipment (UE) in which the communication indicates an acceptance of a UE registration with the PLMN. This example further includes performing a determination of whether an SoR indicator associated with a home PLMN (HPLMN) is embedded within the communication. The UE then manages PLMN selection according to the determination. In another example, a UE is configured to operate according to an SoR configuration in which the UE is configured to ascertain whether an SoR indicator is embedded within a communication from a PLMN. An SoR indicator associated with an HPLMN is then generated and subsequently transmitted from the HPLMN to the UE via the PLMN.